Логотип buryatia.org
Обратная связь    Правила сайта    Размещение рекламы


Богдо баатар бэеэр дайласан туухэ

Начать новую тему   Ответить на тему    Список форумов Сайт бурятского народа -> Соёл түүхын шуулган
  Предыдущая тема :: Следующая тема  
Автор Сообщение
соохор адуу

Зарегистрирован: May 21, 2004
Сообщения: 2359
Откуда: Ургэн Сухын хойноос бэшэ Хабтагай Туулын хаяанаас
СообщениеДобавлено: 08.09.06, 10:40 +0000     Богдо баатар бэеэр дайласан туухэ Ответить с цитатой

средневековый источник по монгольской истории часто сравнивается ССМ.

увидел следующие интересные вещи и решил запостить.


[The opening passage is dated 1201 A.D. Since at least 1196 the aging Kereyit ruler Ong Qan has been fighting the once-dominant Tatars and others for control of Chin China’s northwestern frontier. Orphaned and abandoned as a child, at the age of 34 Temüjin (later Chinggis Qan; called The Emperor here) has become Ong Qan’s most important ally. Jamuqa, who had earlier been a competitor for Ong Qan’s favor as well as Temüjin’s closest friend, has become the leader of the opposition to the two.]


At this time the Onggirat tribe had not yet come to join us.[i][i] The Emperor’s[ii][ii] younger brother Qasar was living apart. Adopting his follower Jebke’s plan, Qasar went to plunder the Onggirat. The Emperor sharply blamed him for this.

The Onggirat then joined Jamuqa. They gathered with the Ikires, the Qorulas, the Dörben, the Tatar, the Qadagin, and the Selji’üt tribes at the Gan[iii][iii] River. Together they named Jamuqa Gur Qan and plotted to attack us. They made a covenant at the *Tülber[iv][iv] river and swore the following oath:

“May any of our covenant who leaks this plan collapse like this riverbank and be felled like this forest!” After these words, they all lifted their feet to trample the bank, and swung their swords to cut down the trees. Galloping their steeds the charging army rode off.


[At this time our forces had a man named Taqaiqa in Jamuqa’s army.] The Emperor’s Jeuret follower *Cha’u’ur[v][v] was his relative and went to visit. They happened to be riding together. *Cha’u’ur did not know about the plot. Taqaiqa tapped him on the side with his whip. *Cha’u’ur looked back to see Taqaiqa looking at him. Realizing Taqaiqa wanted to say something, Cha’u’ur dismounted as if to urinate. Taqaiqa then told him about the river covenant, saying, [“The situation is now critical. Where are you going to go?” *Cha’u’ur was alarmed; on his way home, he encountered the Qorula Yesügei. He told him about the situation and was going to go to tell the Emperor.] [vi][vi]

Yesügei said, “The son of my chief wife has gone to Qulan Buqa[vii][vii][and the day of his return is not known.] Around me I only have children and my servant Qoridai.” So he had Qoridai swear an oath and sent him riding a grey donkey with a white horse following, saying, “When you get there speak only with the Emperor or his Qatun, or to my son-in-law Qasar[viii][viii].” And he told him “If you leak this to anyone else I will split your spine and cut you in half at the waist.” The oath finished, Qoridai left.

On the way he ran into the military perimeter of Qulan Ba’atur and *Qara-mergitei[ix][ix] and was captured by their sentries, but gained his release because of long friendship. He was accordingly given an otter-colored stallion, and was told, “ This horse can save you if you are pursued, and in pursuit can catch anyone. Mount and ride.” He encountered a train of white felt wagon-yurts heading toward Jamuqa’s camp. Men from the train came out to chase *Cha’u’ur, but *Cha’u’ur escaped at a gallop. When he reached the Emperor he told him everything about the plot mentioned above.[x][x]

The Emperor then gathered a force to meet Jamuqa’s troops. They fought at the Qailar Teni-Qorqan[xi][xi] steppe and Jamuqa was defeated. Jamuqa fled, and the Onggirat tribe submitted to us.


1202 A.D.

The Emperor deployed troops at the Ulqui-Shireljin River[xii][xii] to attack the Alchi Tatar and the Cha’an Tatar. In the summer he camped his troops at *Bijan[xiii][xiii]. He began by making his troops swear their agreement to the following: “If we defeat them chase them north. If you see abandoned goods scattered about, you must pay them no heed. When the military business is finished, the plunder will be divided fairly.”

After the great[xiv][xiv] victory, the Emperor’s clansmen Altan, Quchar, and Daritai violated their oath. The Emperor sent the two commanders Qubilai and Jebe to seize all their plunder and distribute it among the troops.


In the fall the Naiman Buiruq Qahan joined with the Merkit chief Toqto’a-beki and the Dörben, Tatar, Qadagin, and Selji’üt tribes, together with A’uchu-ba’atur[xv][xv], Quduqa-beki,[xvi][xvi] and others in order to attack ourselves and Ong Qahan.

The Emperor began by sending riders to climb up and keep watch from Mount Negen-Güiletu, Mount Chekcher, and Mount Chiqürqei.[xvii][xvii] A rider came from Mount Chiqürqei reporting that the Naiman were gradually approaching. From Ulqui-shireljin the Emperor and Ong Qan moved their forces inside the Barrier.[xviii][xviii]

Ong Qahan’s son Ilqa stayed behind the northern Barrier; only after occupying a high ridge did he set up camp. Buiruq was confident, saying, “Their army is scattered; once they are gathered together we can roll them up.”

At this time A’uchu and Qodu,[xix][xix] under Emel’s command,[xx][xx] came to join the vanguard. They were about to attack but they saw that Ilqa’s army’s situation was strong, so they returned. Ilqa also tried to cross the barrier and join our troops to make ready for war. The baggage-wagons were moved to a different location. The Emperor and Ong Qahan relied on the Aral barrier[xxi][xxi] as a bulwark.]

There was a great battle at Köyiten[xxii][xxii] steppe . The enemy raised a windstorm. The storm suddenly turned to snow. Their blinded troops confusedly fell into ditches and tumbled into ravines as they retreated. On the way Jamuqa, leading his own troops in retreat and happening to encounter the tribes who had made him Qahan, plundered them.


In the winter the Emperor went out of the barrier and camped at Mount Abji’a-köteger.[xxiii][xxiii] Ong Qahan camped at the Berke desert.[xxiv][xxiv]At this time the Emperor and Prince Jochi wanted to marry Jochi to Ong Qahan’s daughter Cha’ur-beki, and Ong Qahan’s grandson Tusaqa also sought the hand of the Emperor’s daughter, the princess Qojin-beki. Ong Qahan rejected these requests.


From this time there was a little distance between the Emperor and Ong Qahan. Jamuqa heard about this and went to Ilqa, saying “ My anda often sends envoys to make deals with Tayang Qan of the Naiman. For you, no good can come from this. If you now attack him, I will stand shoulder to shoulder with you.”

At this time Ilqa was living apart. He went to meet his father Ong Qahan. The Emperor’s kinsmen Daritai-otchigin, Altan, and Qochar, together with Taqai[xxv][xxv], *Qurqaila, *Qadarkid, Muqur-Qaurun[xxvi][xxvi] , and Jamuqa were all opposed to us. They spoke to Ilqa as follows: “We all intend to assist you to the limit of our power in punishing the sons of Queen Mother Hö’elün.” Ilqa accepted their offer, and making camp within a circle of wagon-yurts they laid their plans. They sent Sayiqan-tödö’en to speak to Ong Qahan. Ong Qan said, “Jamuqa is a smooth-talking, unreliable man. He should not be trusted.” Ilqa sent back the reply, “Jamuqa has a mouth and a tongue;[xxvii][xxvii] for what reason should I not trust him?” Several times he sent men to speak with Ong Qahan; Ong Qahan said, “If I forbid you, you will not obey me. My life is over[xxviii][xxviii]; now I am dependent on others. I only hope that my tired old scattered bones find a peaceful resting place. Now the chatter is unceasing. You should yourself do what you are able to do; don’t give me grief. [Now under a different command, my pastures will all be burned”].[xxix][xxix]


1203 A.D.

In the spring Ong Qahan craftily said, “Earlier he proposed a marriage alliance, but I rejected it. Now it should be accepted. Wait until he comes to the confirmation feast, and then seize him. Then he sent Buqatai and Kichalai[xxx][xxx] to invite the Emperor. The Emperor assembled ten riders to accompany him on the visit. He stayed one night in the camp of Father Monglik. When the next day came he conferred with Father Monglik. He sent a messenger to answer Ong Qahan, saying “My herds are starved and weak and I must tend them. Isn’t it enough to send one man to celebrate the feast?” After sending the messenger the Emperor returned home.


At that time Ong Qahan’s attendant Yeke-Chaqaran[xxxi][xxxi] learned of the plot against the Emperor. Returning home he told his wife, adding “If someone were to leak word of this to the Emperor, who can tell what would happen?” His son Ilqan[xxxii][xxxii]stopped him, saying “This is just talk. But I’m afraid others might think it’s serious.” Yeke-Chaqaran’s herdsman Kishilik[xxxiii][xxxiii] happened to come by bringing kumiss and, unobserved, overheard what was said. He asked his brother Badai “What was this that they were discussing just now? Might you know something about it?” Badai said, “I don’t know anything.”

Chaqaran’s second son Narin was sitting outside his yurt sharpening his arrowheads. Badai heard him curse, saying [“The tongue-cutter! We shouldn’t be talking right now! Today’s business is already decided. Whose mouth should they be silencing? ”]. Badai said to Kishilik “We know now. Let us visit the Emperor and inform him”. They then went to their own yurt to plan the trip. They only had one lamb, which they slaughtered. They chopped up and burned their bed frame to cook it. That night they sped to the Emperor to report the plot, saying “Ong Qahan is plotting against the Prince[xxxiv][xxxiv]. The scheme has been decided on.”


Upon hearing this, the Emperor stationed his troops at the Aral barrier and quickly shifted his baggage-wagons to the upper reach of the Shireljin River[xxxv][xxxv]. He sent Jelme ahead as the advance guard along north side of Mount Mau-yundur.[xxxvi][xxxvi] Ong Qahan also sent troops along Mau-yundur’s south side from Mount Hula’ut and Mount Buraqut.[xxxvii][xxxvii]

At this time *Taichu and Yeder[xxxviii][xxxviii] were pasturing horses and saw Ong Qahan’s troops coming. They immediately went to inform the Emperor. He then moved his troops to the Qaraljit steppe[xxxix][xxxix] . [He had not yet readied his troops when the sun went behind the mountain. As soon as his troops were in order he went out to fight.] First the Emperor defeated the troops of the Jirgin[xl][xl] tribe, and next he defeated the troops of the Dongqayit tribe.[xli][xli]He then defeated Qori-Shilemun-taishi’s troops, and advanced to press Ong Qahan, who took a defensive position. Ong’s son Ilqa came charging up to strike the Emperor’s line. Our troops shot him in the cheek.


His situation gravely precarious, [Ong Qan] pulled in his troops and retreated. The Emperor also withdrew to the Ornu’u-*kelgelge[xlii][xlii] , following the Qalqa[xliii][xliii]downstream and dividing his troops into two columns. The Emperor himself led 2300 riders on the south bank, while the Uru’ut and Mangqut tribes with 2300 troops followed the north bank.

As a Onggirat son-in-law the Emperor first sent a messenger to their leaders Temüge and Emel,[xliv][xliv] saying “If you come and obey me your daughter “faces” and your niece hostages[xlv][xlv] will live on. Otherwise we will attack you.” He then proceeded to the Tüngge[xlvi][xlvi] marsh at Torqa-qorqa[xlvii][xlvii]to bivouac his troops.

[Having survived Ong Qan’s attack, Temüjin gathers his forces and issues a challenge to Ong Qan and his supporters, including his relatives the Jurkin or Jirgin. In a sneak attack he destroys Ong Qan’s forces and becomes Chinggis Qan, and after mopping up the Naiman and the Merkit turns his attention to the sedentary lands of Khwarizm, the Tangut Hsi-hsia, and Chin China].

комментарии к этому смотрите http://www3.asuultserver.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=41134&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=26

кураласы и их потомки горлосы являются потомками Алангоа и хоринцев Хорёодай мэргэна.
Вернуться к началу
Посмотреть профиль Отправить личное сообщение Отправить e-mail Yahoo Messenger ICQ Number
соохор адуу

Зарегистрирован: May 21, 2004
Сообщения: 2359
Откуда: Ургэн Сухын хойноос бэшэ Хабтагай Туулын хаяанаас
СообщениеДобавлено: 08.09.06, 10:49 +0000     Ответить с цитатой

решил все полностью вставить.



As a primary source based on a Mongol original, the Sheng-wu Ch’in-cheng Lu, for all its problems, gives us a version of the Mongols’ own understanding of the sources of Chinggis’ power. These are not what we would expect. Neither here nor in the Secret History is Temüjin credited with extraordinary valor or prowess, and supernatural forces are virtually absent. (When belief in such forces is present, it usually backfires on the believer). The SW is a chronicle, not a poem, and is quite soberly written. (The SH is likewise a chronicle, and its many poetic passages are always in the voices of characters in the story). In these texts we are shown a man who attracts followers by his honor, fairness, and generosity, and whose severity is always grounded on righteousness. (What we can further deduce from these same texts is a patient, disciplined man of iron will who achieved his goals through extraordinary shrewdness, ruthlessness and treachery.) Rather than a heroic epic,[xlviii][xlviii] what we see in the SW is a skeletal account of the making and dissolution of alliances, the timely delivery of crucial military intelligence, and battles and their outcomes.

Like any source, the SW requires critical examination. This text is believed to be a Chinese translation of a Mongol chronicle, the Altan Debter, which was also used by Rashid ad-Din. (The SW and Rashid ad-Din generally report the same events in the same sequence, and many of the same petty details are similiarly reported in the two works; the SH account frequently deviates widely from theirs.) Pelliot has concluded that the Chinese SW translation was probably produced in Khubilai’s Chinese realm in the third quarter of the 12th century.[xlix][xlix]

In the sections he has translated Pelliot makes a number of emendations (as does Wang Kuo-wei). Some of these are based on text variants and can easily be justified, but others are more conjectural and might be questioned. Likewise, when the Yuan Shih provides a fuller or more intelligible interpretation of a SW passage, it might because the YS editors had access to other sources or a superior text; but it is also possible that they made sense of a choppy passage by rewriting it on their own authority. Pelliot consistently attributes problems to various sorts of damage during transmission, whereas I am inclined to believe that, due to the incapacities of the translator or translators, the SW Chinese text was never very good.[l][l]

The most serious problems with the SW and the SH are the result of their late composition under Chinggisid auspices. The Altan Debter, Rashid ad-Din’s work, the SH, the and probably the SW were all official documents of the new Mongol state, and as such presented slanted pictures of the events described.

To begin with, these chronicles served as charters of nobility for the leading Mongol families in Mongol China and Persia. Rashid, writing toward the end of the 12th century (at least two generations after Chinggis’ death), made extensive use of oral reports from eminent Persian Mongols, and often listed the contemporary descendents of Chinggis’ supporters. One can surmise that the contributions of figures without descendants in the Ilqanate would tend to be passed over or minimized, whereas the roles of the ancestors of Rashid’s important contemporaries would tend to be exaggerated. (The YS also details the subsequent family histories of the companions of Chinggis Qan, and is to be suspected to similar distortions. The YS is heavily dependent on the SW for the early Mongol period, but also includes information from other sources.)

A second and more important problem is the minimization of the contributions of figures whose deeds might prove embarrassing to Temüjin. To begin with, the progress of narrative is rather clumsy because Temüjin must be made the central character, requiring Ong Qan’s history to be told in flashbacks both in the SW and the SH. In fact, right up until the deciding battle between the two, Ong Qan was a more important figure than Temüjin, and an impartial history would begin the story with Ong Qan and gradually introduce Temüjin.

From the texts we have it is difficult to see why Jamuqa should have been able to play such a major role at all. He first appears on the scene at the head of twenty thousand troops (SH 104), and he must have had great victories which allowed him to compete with Temüjin for Ong Qan’s favor and to lead the opposition to the two of them, but we are told nothing of these deeds. Both Qasar and Monglik’s seven sons assuredly performed major feats in support of Temüjin during the latter’s rise to power, but we are not given any details of these either. The shifting loyalties of Ong-Qan’s brother Jaqa-gambu are hard to trace in the sources, but he seems clearly to have given important help to Temüjin at certain stages in his career; both these events and Jaqa-gambu’s ultimate fate are obscured in the sources.

I believe that these stories are repressed because a full telling of their stories would put Temüjin in a bad light. [li][li] The two chronicles are unembarrassed by Temüjin’s cruelty and also are not afraid to show him in a position of weakness and dependency. But both sources need to show Temüjin as a strong, loyal, generous leader, and episodes showing him to be ungrateful, devious, or treacherous would destroy this picture.

Righteousness was crucial to the Mongols. In both the SH and the SW one of the longest single sections is Temüjin’s indictment of Ong Qan, within which he puts Ong Qan in the wrong by showing that Temüjin had helped Ong Qan more than the latter had helped him, but that Ong Qan had proved ungrateful. (Elsewhere Ong Qan likewise indignantly denounces the disloyal supporters led by his own brother Jaqa Gambu: PH pp. 416-7.) But in fact Temüjin destroyed everyone who helped him on the way up except for those who were willing to subordinate themselves to him absolutely. (In Hambis’ delicious understatement, “Chinggis Qan was not someone who shared”).[lii][lii] A fuller account of the stories of Jamuqa, Qasar, Teb Tenggri and his brothers, and Jaqa Gambu would have cast doubt on Temüjin’s righteousness.

The most serious problem with the sources is a large number of discrepancies between the Altan Debter tradition (represented by Rashid, the SW, and the YS) and the SH on the dating and sequence of events. It is extremely difficult to match events in one of these traditions to events in the other; for example, SH 141 includes elements scattered in four different places in the SW. I tentatively tried to match the SH and SW versions of the period between Temüjin’s first battle with Jamuqa (SW pp.15-30, SH 120-- 129) and Temüjin’s retreat to Baljuna after his first battle with Ong Qan. (SW p. 100, SH 177). After labeling the SW events (and elements of events) from A to Z, I rearranged them according to the SH sequence. The resulting sequence was A, E, K, O, Q, R, F, W, X, Y, Z, J, C, B, I, M, T, U, G, H, D. (Elements L, N, P, S, V of the SW were not found in the SH). This sequencing is quite provisional and might well need revision on points of detail, but I think that it is clear enough that at least one of the accounts is scrambled.

In the SW Temüjin fights against the Tatar (alone or in coalition) six times in all: pp. 43, 68-9, 73-4, 75, 81, and 82. In the SH the Tatar are involved in only three battles: in SH 133, SH 141-3, and SH 153. SH 133 neatly match SW p. 43; this is the battle in which Ong Qan and Temüjin received their titles from the Chinese. The event in SH 153 is clearly the same event as that in SW p. 81 (section C in my translation), and probably the same as the battle at Dalan-nemurges in SW pp. 73-4 (not translated); this is the battle after which Daritai and the others are stripped of their plunder. But in the SH this event takes place after the battle at Köyiten, whereas in the SW it takes place before it. The third battle, in SH 141-3 at Köyiten, seems to merge three battles reported in SW pp. 68-9, 75, and 82: the first (not in my translation) against an alliance at Buira after an oath at the Alqui spring; the second (my section B) against Jamuqa the Gur Qan at Qailar Teni-qorqan, and the third (my section D) against a coalition at Köyiten.

I believe that these problems derive from orality, but in a different sense than has been so often said. Both sources are “oral history”: late paste-ups of material gathered long after the fact from a variety of oral sources by compiler-editors who did not have first-hand knowledge of the events. After the materials had been gathered, the two editors put the pieces together in a connected story as best they could.

It can easily be shown that this is the case in the SH. Onon notes that in SH 199 and 202 events taking place in the year 1218 A.D. are reported for the year 1206 A.D. Both of these are Tiger years, and the compiler obviously simply put these events in the wrong Tiger year. Such a mistake could not have been made by anyone with direct experience of these events; these errors lead one to suspect that the SH was not produced by Temüjin’s young contemporary Shigi Qutuqu and may well have been was produced later than 1228.

From this point of view it seems likely that SH 141-3 merges at least two different battles against Temüjin, one fought by a coalition at Buira and the other fought against the Gur Qan Jamuqa at Köyiten. But it is also possible that the SW in some cases presents two different reports of a single battle as two different battles: for example, in the SH Daritai is stripped of his plunder after a battle against the Tatar at Dalan-nemurges. A battle against the Tatar at Dalan-nemurges is reported on SW pp. 73-4, but Daritai is stripped of his plunder after a different battle against the Tatar on p. 81. Since the second passage has certain textual problems, perhaps it describes the same battle, and should be moved up to pp. 73-4. Furthermore, the two problems are not mutually exclusive: perhaps in some places the SH merges, whereas in other places the SW splits. All these questions require further investigation.


By and large the rivers and lakes named here can be easily identified, whereas the mountains, valleys, and steppes can only roughly be located in relation to these bodies of water. However, the broad geographical significance of the passage is clear. Most of the action takes place in the general area of Lake Hulun and Lake Buir, at the eastern end of the Mongol world and on the northwestern frontier of Chin China. (This area is still a frontier area, at the intersection of Mongolia, Chinese Inner Mongolia, Chinese Manchuria, and Russian Siberia.) Sections A and B take place north of lake Hulun, near the present Gen, Telbür, and Hailar rivers, all of which flow west into the Ergune. Most of the rest of the action takes place south and east of Lake Buir, near the Qalqa, Urgen, Sheljin, and Guiler rivers. When Ong Qan returned to the Berke desert in section E, however, he traveled west several hundred miles to his base area near the Tuula River.

The Tatar, in alliance with the Chin Chinese, had earlier dominated the Chin northwestern frontier, but during the 1190’s the Chin and the Tatar had come into conflict, and in 1196 Ong Qan and Temüjin had capitalized on the situation by defeating a Tatar army fleeing from the Chin.[liii][liii] From that point on Ong Qan’s Kereyit, with Temüjin’s help, began making their claim to control of the frontier area -- together with the plunder and/or subsidies coming from China. In the present passage they are the aggressors in the Tatar homeland, several hundred miles east of their own lands.

Of the others named here, Altan, Seche-beki, Jamuqa and many others were kin and old friends of Temüjin who were unwilling to accept his demand for sole leadership and total control. The Selji’üt, Qadagin, Dörben, and Onggirat were native to the area east of the two lakes. During the period of Tatar dominance they had been enemies of that tribe, but now they had allied themselves with the weakened Tatar in order to resist the Kereyit and the Mongols. The Merkit and the Naiman, by contrast, came from even farther away than the Kereyit and the Mongols: the Naiman homeland was west and north of the Kereyit homeland, and the Merkit homeland was north of it. These tribes had joined the alliance knowing that if the Kereyit were to succeed in seizing control of the Chinese frontier, they would be in a good position to control all of the Mongol tribes.


In the Mongol world power did not come from control of territory or of stores of wealth but from military leadership. The sources, especially the SW, are extraordinarily attentive to decisions to affiliate or disaffiliate, to security and breaches of security, and to loyalty and treachery. Allegiance could not be assumed on the basis either of kinship, or of hereditary vassalage, or of territorial contiguity. Any tribe, and any warrior with or without his tribe, could affiliate with any war chief as long as a state of feud was not in force between them. However, these affiliations were only temporary: in the course of the brief passage I have translated, the Onggirat change sides at least three times. Almost the only coercive hold any leader had on his followers was the threat to appropriate, adopt, enslave or massacre the women and children which he had under his protection.

In the Mongol world there was no cropland, no disarmed peasantry attached to the land, no need to work the land, no lords defined by their holdings of land, no significant fortifications or defensive bulwarks, and no stores of food or wealth except for livestock. Livestock are not only moveable, but require constant movement as they exhaust the grazing lands, and Mongols carried all their other property with them as they followed the herds. Under these circumstances, the possession of wealth and the control of territory were extraordinarily volatile. On the one hand, a bold raider could steal or stampede much of the real wealth of a careless clan or individual. On the other, a militarily strong qan could move his tribe and its flocks onto a weaker tribe’s grazing land without the necessity of protecting his home base. (By contrast, a sedentary lord had to defend both his stores of food and the crops in the ground). Except during wartime and war councils, Mongols lived in small groups widely dispersed over vast areas, and no leader had direct means of control over anyone except his own camp. Warfare could not be defensive and was always offensive, and the main events were the surprise attacks of one transient coalition on another. For the civilized peoples bordering on the steppe from China and Iran to Greece and Rome, the volatile, ever-changing steppe world seemed nightmarishly chaotic, and it is not hard to see why.

Even in the very brief passage translated here there are numerous decisions to affiliate or disaffiliate. The fluidity and voluntarism of coalition-building did not mean the system was not harsh. Spies and traitors were summarily killed. Smaller and weaker tribes normally lived near the more powerful tribes, and their families could thus be held hostage[liv][liv]. Early in the SW we see the Jeuret tribe destroyed mostly because they could not decide whether to affiliate with the Tayyichi’ut or with Temüjin’s Kiyat.[lv][lv] In Section J above threats are used to impress the Onggirat into Temüjin’s coalition. This tribe was divided; Temüjin’s wife was from the Onggirat, as were many Mongol wives. Temüjin received a great deal of support from individual Onggirat, but the tribe switched back and forth repeatedly. In Section A above, the Onggirat do not join Temüjin because Temüjin’s brother Qasar had plundered them. In Section B they do join him after his defeat of Jamuqa. But they must have deserted again at some point, because in Section J he has to force their allegiance. (Tribes which changed sides were put on the front lines – because they were not trusted, and in order to prove themselves. Of the tribes listed in this passage, Ong Qan’s Dongqayit (section I) had at one time been affiliated with Temüjin[lvi][lvi] and were for that reason put on the front lines, and the same is probably true of Ong’s Jirgin and Temüjin’s Mangqut and Uru’ut in section J.)[lvii][lvii]

When Qasar, Temüjin’s full brother, is spoken of as “living apart” in Section A, it means that he was not under Temüjin’s command. (Likewise, Ilqa-Senggum in section F was not under his father’s command). Apartness does not mean enmity, but it does mean freedom from control, with enmity as one possibility. (When Temüjin separates from Jamuqa in SH 118, he is refusing subordination and implicitly inviting Jamuqa’s other followers to desert him, and Temüjin and Jamuqa are soon at war). After he was rebuked by Temüjin for his attack on the Onggirat, Qasar almost certainly joined Temüjin’s enemies. The SW does not say so explicitly, but later in the text he is shown rejoining Temüjin before the second battle with Ong Qan, leaving his family in Ong Qan’s control. Some sources say that his family had been captured, but it is more likely that Qasar had fought against his brother in the Temüjin’s first battle against Ong Qan -- sections I and J above. (Oddly enough, so did the Onggirat whom he had driven into Ong’s camp)[lviii][lviii].

At one point in his career Qasar came very near death at his brother’s hands – his life being saved at the last minute by their mother Hö’elün (SH 244). In the Mongol world, the significance of blood relationship was highly ambiguous. Noble “bone” clans were defined by paternal descent, which accounts for the long genealogies in the SH. However, all members of noble clans had a claim to clan leadership and thus were each other’s potential, and usually actual, enemies. At the beginning of his career Temüjin led an army including most of his kin (SH 122), but he ultimately was responsible for the deaths of many or even most of his male relatives – notably, all known members of the Jurkin. (This is sometimes spoken of as an innovation of his, but all strong Qans became so in part by eliminating their competing kin; Ong Qan, who killed two of his brothers and frequently was in conflict with the other two, is a prime example).[lix][lix]

Tribes were often divided between two coalitions – either an individual or a subtribe could independently join the coalition to which the tribe belonged. While a tribe’s divided affiliation might a sign of disunity and weakness, the story is really more complex than that. Faced with an uncertain outcome, a tribe might in effect hedge its bets by giving some support to both sides. That way the tribe would survive regardless of the outcome. For weak tribes this could be simply a survival strategy, but relatively strong tribes might adopt this strategy in the hope that they will be able to profit from the destruction of one side or the other. Tribal factional disputes could be integrated into this strategy: the sub-tribal leader affiliated with the winning coalition would become leader of the whole tribe after dispatching the sub-tribal leader affiliated with the losing coalition. I believe that these considerations explain the support Temüjin got in section B above from the Qorulas Yesügei and Qara-mergitei, even though their clan was affiliated with Temüjin’s enemy Jamuqa.

Choice of affiliation was a life-and-death choice, uncertain in its outcome and weighty in its consequences. In section H we see Yeke-chaqaran and his family thinking about warning Temüjin but deciding to stay with Ong Qan; meanwhile, their servants Badai and Kishlik make their own decision and go to warn Temüjin. By risking their lives in this way Badai and Kishlik gained their freedom and established their families for many generations, whereas Yeke-chaqaran and his son probably did not survive the battle. In all sources we repeatedly see Temüjin, who had a reputation for generosity and fairness, receiving critical information from informants who were usually not noble: besides Badai and Kishlik, other examples in this short passage include Cha’u’ur, Qoridai, Yeder, and Taqai.

As a consequence of these continually shifting coalitions, individuals and whole tribes repeatedly found themselves fighting side-by-side with warriors they had only recently been trying to kill. From our perspective this is almost unintelligible, but the Mongols seemingly had no difficulty with this. In part this can be explained by the fact that, for the Mongols, warfare as such was unproblematic: rather than a fight against evil or a breakdown of the cosmic order, war was a sacred opportunity to gain merit. Seemingly, after a battle only the kin of the two coalition leaders contesting for leadership (their “bone” clans) had any issue to settle (which was usually done be executing the losers). The other survivors simply packed up their gear and waited for the next call to battle.

From the civilized perspective the ever-changing world of steppe politics, with its almost entire absence of secure positions or permanent affiliations, seems virtually insane – like the Alice-in-Wonderland croquet match in which the ball, the wickets, and the mallets all had their own mind and moved around as they wished. It is not surprising that the steppe was rarely united, and it is amazing that Temüjin or anyone else was able to unite it at all. The Mongol concept of the Qan was inherently unstable. On the one hand, all Mongols admired the strong Qans of legend. On the other, few well-born Mongols were really willing to submit themselves to anyone. Everyone’s first choice was to be Qan, and everyone’s second choice was to remain independent, with the consequence that there would be no Qan.

There were, however, unifying tendencies. All Mongols understood that during periods of disunity the Mongols fought among themselves for paltry spoils, whereas the united peoples of the steppe under the great Hsiung-nü, Turkish, and Uighur Qans gained rich plunder and tribute from the sedentary peoples. Furthermore, most Mongols were commoners and could not aspire to be Qan. Their interest was entirely in unity. When individuals or tribal groups submitted themselves or their children to Temüjin they were gambling that he would be the one to unify the Mongols. The many scattered decision of individuals and small groups to change affiliation may seem to be examples of the uncontrollable disorder of the steppe, but in fact they are forces for order.

At the beginning of his career (in his first battle against Jamuqa) Temüjin led a clan army, and in many cases he received help from such in-law clans as the Onggirat and the Qongqotan. For him, however, these were only resources to be exploited. Ultimately he destroyed his own clan, killing most of its contemporary members. Temüjin’s policy was to gain the absolute personal loyalty of talented nökör: non-noble followers who might disagree with him in council, but who would not contest his leadership.

Temüjin’s policy is sometimes described as “democratic”, since he favored commoners, but in fact he favored them because they were more submissive. His personal unwillingness to share power at all coincided with the Mongol’s perceived need for unity, which is expressed in two forms early in the SH. In SH 76 Temujin’s mother Ho’elun cites Mother Alan’s parable of the arrows (SH 22) to encourage her sons to cooperate, but Temujin does not listen and kills Bekter – his rival for the leadership of Ho’elun’s tiny clan. His model of unity is hierarchal rather than cooperative and is expressed by Bodonchar in SH 33-35: “It’s good for a body to have a head, and for a coat to have a collar.... Those people on the Tunggelik stream just now, they have no big or small, good or bad, head or hooves – everybody’s equal. They are a simple people – let’s go plunder them.”

Bekter understands Temujin’s motive” “We are unable to endure our bitterness against our Tayyichi’ut kinsmen and are asking ourselves who of us will settle the score”. Bekter, who had bullying Temujin and Qasar, had expected to lead the family in their quest for vengeance, but Temujin was unwilling to accept his leadership. While Ho’elun’s speech in SH 78 comparing Temujin to various savage beasts was in one respect an angry denunciation, it in the context of the whole Secret History it also amounts to a prophecy that Temujin, a man of transcendent violence and iron will, was the man who would eventually unite the Mongols by destroying all his rivals. Once he had succeeded in doing this by the shrewd manipulation of ties of kinship, intermarriage, sworn brotherhood (anda), and vassalage (nökör) and his strategic mix of generosity, ruthlessness, loyalty, and treachery, world conquest was hardly an intimidating task.


[lx][i] Wang Kuo-wei (p. 74) prefers a variant “also came to join us”. However, nothing in the text justifies the “also”. Temüjin had friends among the Onggirat, including his father-in-law Deyi-sechen who in a passage just above this one had sent him a warning about an impending attack (SW p. 69). I believe that it is assumed here that the Onggirat were already talking about joining Temüjin when Qasar raided them.

[lxi][ii] “Emperor” (shang): literally “The One Above”, “The High One”, etc. The SW is notable for its anachronistic and inaccurate use of titles. Thus, Ong Qan is referred to as Ong Qahan, and once even as Ong Qan Qahan, even though he never held that title. Temüjin is referred to as Emperor from the beginning, even though he certainly was not an emperor during most of the period covered. His mother Hö’elün is referred to as the Queen Mother, a title she never held.

[lxii][iii] SW 78-9; SH 141; deR. IV– pp. 78-9. The Gen, Gegen, or Kan, a tributary of the Ergune.

[lxiii][iv] According to SW, p. 76, the Tülber is a tributary of the Gen. There is a presently a town called Telbür on the upper reaches of a river (unnamed on my map) which flows into the Gen near its confluence with the Ergune.

[lxiv][v] This is a conjectural reconstruction, by analogy with the name Cha’ur in this same fragment which is written identically except without the middle wu. Cha’u’ur and his deed are mentioned in YS 123, p. 3022.

[lxv][vi] The first two sentences could also be “...the charging troop rode off toward our forces. There was among [Jamuqa’s] troops a soldier named Taqaiqa.” (This would have to be the translation if the Chinese verb fu requires a destination.) I have chosen this version because I do not believe that Jamuqa’s troops went off directly to attack Temüjin’s forces, but rather to gather their own forces for the attack. If they had attacked immediately, there would not have been time to warn Temüjin. (A few lines further down we see wagon-yurts on their way to Jamuqa’s camp, indicating that Jamuqa’s force was still assembling.)

It is my interpretation that Taqaiqa was either unwillingly in Jamuqa’s camp, or else deliberately there as a spy, but could not risk going directly to Temüjin and needed to find an intermediary. When Cha’u’ur happened to come to visit a relative in Taqaiqa’s camp (not Taqaiqa himself), Taqaiqa took advantage of the opportunity to get word to Temüjin, knowing that Cha’u’ur was a supporter of Temüjin. “As if to urinate” is Wang Kuo-wei’s interpretation.

This is a difficult passage without exact parallels in the other available texts. While I believe that my translation is plausible and allowable, I cannot be completely confident about it.

[lxvi][vii] The Qulan or Qulan-ba’atur in SH 48 and 50, Yeke-cheren’s father, was the brother of Temüjin’s grandfather Bartan-ba’atur. Qulan was the youngest of Qabul’s sons (PH p. 125) and was much younger than Bartan, so he could easily have been alive and active at this time; we know (PH pp. 36, 78 ) that he fought in Temüjin’s forces in his first battle against Jamuqa. Qulan’s son Yeke-cheren was in Jamuqa’s camp, as were the Qorulas and the Jurkin, and in the YS biography of Cha’u’ur ( #123 p. 3022) “Qulan-Yerki” is named – presumably “Qulan the Jurkin”. It thus seems likely that Yesügei’s son mentioned here was in Jamuqa’s camp. (In Rashid vol. II p. 163 Qulan is described as a Tayyichi’ut, but also as one of the hui-yin irgen or “forest people”. Nekun-taishi, Temüjin’s uncle, is also so described; the meaning is unclear but probably unrelated to the “forest people” of the Mongol far northwest. On this, see also Pelliot, pp. 184, 112, 78-81, using a different version of Rashid).

[lxvii][viii] SW p. 78, citing Rashid, says that Qasar’s wife Altan was a Qorula, presumably the daughter of this Yesügei.

[lxviii][ix] Qara-Mergitei was a Qorula; according to Rashid (vol. II, pp. 162-3) he favored Temüjin even though the Qorulas were in Jamuqa’s coalition. The willingness of Qara-mergitei (who was apparently part of Jamuqa’s force) and Taqaiqa to inform Temüjin of Jamuqa’s is understandable if, as is likely, the Qorulas had been forcibly impressed into Jamuqa’s coalition (just as the Qonggirat under Terge and Emel are impressed by Temüjin at the end of this translated passage).

[lxix][x]The SW account of this event is by far the most detailed. In SH 141 only Qoridai is mentioned in a very terse account. In YS (#1 p. 8; #123 p. 3022) Taqaiqa, Cha’u’ur, and Qulan are mentioned in a slightly more detailed account. Rashid (vol. II, p. 162-3) mentions the Qorulas Qoridai and Qara-Mergitei and Qulan-ba’atur, whom he calls a Tayyichi’ut; he also mentions a second Mergitei who I think may have been an error for Yesügei, who is otherwise mentioned only in the SW. Perhaps the others thought the original story was too complicated and messy to repeat; alternatively, two different accounts of the same event may have been merged in the Altan Debter. Descendents of such heroes gained great advantage from their ancestor’s exploits, so there was a motive here for deliberate distortion.

[lxx][xi] Qailar-teni-qorqan: SW 80. Not mentioned in SH. In the Cha’u’ur biography (YS #123 p. 3022) this place is called “Qailar-*adai’irqun.” In Rashid it is “*Yedi-qorqan”. The Qailar is the present Hailar, which runs west into the Ergune, south of the Gen and the Tülber and close to the northeastern end of Lake Kulun. According to Wang Kuo-wei (p. 80), the Teni can be identified with the *Terge river flowing SW into the Qailar; this would seem to place the battle fairly far east on the upper Qailar near or on the west slope of the Khingan mountains. There is a town named Orqohan on the upper reaches of the Hailar.

[lxxi][xii] Ulqui-shireljin. SW pp. 81, 84; SH 153, 173; Pelliot Marco Polo (I p. 326); Rashid , vol. II, p. 165. According to de Rachewiltz (V. p. 64) this is the present Urgen River, S and W of Lake Buir, and its tributary the Seljin; the phrase means “Shireljin of the Ulqui”.

[lxxii][xiii] I cannot identify Bijan. There may be textual problems here; the previous sentence has no subject.

[lxxiii][xiv] Literally this word means “repeatedly”, which does not fit here, but the meanings “extremely” and “intensely” are also listed in the CWTTT. Earlier the word is also used to describe Ong Qan’s denunciation of Jaqa Gambu, where “repeatedly” also does not work. I think the sense is “made emphatic by reiteration”, “thoroughly”, “in every way”.

[lxxiv][xv] A’uchu-ba’atur is described as a Mongol in SH 142 and as a Tayyichi’ut in 144; he is killed with the rest of the Tayyichi’ut leaders in 148. He is called a Qadagin on vol. II, p. 165 of Rashid, and a Selji’üt elsewhere (see PH 158-62). This may be a case of shifting affiliations rather than an error on Rashid’s part.

[lxxv][xvi] Quduqa-beki: SH 142-4, 237-41. An Oyirat from the far northwest and one of the magicians responsible for the counterproductive snowstorm. After defeat he retreated to his homeland; later on he was first of the Oyirat to submit.

[lxxvi][xvii] Chiqürqei, Chekcher, Negen-guiltu: three mountains east of lakes Kulun and Buir and near the Qalqa river. SW 84, deR II-61, IV-80. Chekcher SH 61, 67, 94, and 142, (the Jeje’er heights in SH 166 and 185 is different and farther west); Rashid, vol. II, pp. 164, 183; PH 419, 426-428. Yesügei passed Mount Chekcher on the last fatal trip to find a bride for Temüjin. Chiqürqei is always paired with Chekcher; Negen-guiltu (in the SH, Enegen-guiletu) is seen only here.

[lxxvii][xviii] An exact knowledge of the geography of this passage, with its complicated movements and countermovements might illuminate Temüjin’s strategy and tactics. My guess is that Temujin took his stand near the Chin wall between the Guiler and the Qalqa rivers, and that Ong Qan came down from the north, traveling on the east side of Lakes Hulun and Buir. Comparison with the SH and Rashid is not very helpful, especially since SH 141-2 seems to merge at least two different battles in two different years. It is my assumption that the “Barrier” and “Aral barrier” mentioned here, “Utkiya” in the SH, and “Utgu” in Rashid are different names for, or different parts of, a complex fortification: the wall built by the Chin dynasty around 1190-96 A.D. to the west of the Khingan mountains and east of Lakes Kulun and Buir. (This wall should be distinguished both from the “Great Wall”, which was located much farther south and did not exist as such before the Ming, and from the “Wall of Genghis Khan” earlier built further west by the Khitan Liao.) The Chin did not extend their control as far into Mongolia as had the Khitan Liao, and it was in 1196 that the Chin alliance with the Tatar broke down, to the great advantage of Ong Qan and Temüjin.

The map on p. 50 of Vol. 6 of Tan’s historical atlas shows a complex of walls in this area; the physical geography is shown on ZJ, p. 142 and Sivin, p. 22.

See SW p. 84-6, 97, 99; Rashid vol. II, pp. 165-6; PH 409, 426; SH 141-2 “Utkiya”; deR IV-80; Brettschneider p. 47 fn111; Waley Travels p. 63. Pelliot planned a note on the Aral barrier in his section #24, but he did not live to write it. I have not seen any discussion of the names “Utgu” or “Utkiya”.

[lxxviii][xix] Qodu. Younger brother of Toqto’a; sometimes called his son. PH, pp. 285-7.

[lxxix][xx] Emel (possibly Terge-emel) was a Qonggirat leader, who here apparently commands A’uchu and Qodu. The Qonggirat had submitted to Temüjin after his defeat of Jamuqa at Qailar-teni-qorqan steppe, but Emel at least had reneged and rejoined Jamuqa. After Temüjin’s first battle with Ong Qan Emel and the Onggirat will be impressed into Temüjin’s forces (Section I of my translation).

[lxxx][xxi] Aral Barrier: “Aral” means “island” and can denote areas in general which are bounded by water, so perhaps the “Aral” barrier is the part of the wall between the upper Qalqa and upper Guiler. The Guiler cut through the Khingan Mountains from west to east and was an important strategic route into Chin territory.

[lxxxi][xxii] Köyiten steppe: Near Lake Kulun and Mounts Chekcher and Chiqürqei. SH pp. 143, 147; deR IV-80; Rashid, vol. II pp. 165, 171; SW p. 87.

[lxxxii][xxiii] Abji’a Köteger: SH 187, 191; deR VII-61; PH 409; Rashid, vol. II, p. 166; SW 87-8. Near sources of Qalqa River, ESE of lake Buir; winter camp of Qonggirat.

[lxxxiii][xxiv] Berke desert: SH 166; deR V-73; SW 88; Rashid, vol. II, p. 167. According to de Rachewiltz it is near the Jeje’er Heights (identified by Perlee with Bayan Ula) at approximately 47 degrees N and 109 degrees E. This is in the Mongol or Kereyit homeland, far west of most of the action of this passage.

[lxxxiv][xxv] Early in Temüjin’s career (while Altan and the other Jurkin were still following Temüjin), the Suldus Taqai served with Sugegei as an emissary from Temüjin to Ong Qan; he also may have led a contingent of Qongqiyat and Sügen in the first battle against Jamuqa. Here he is affiliated with Ong Qan and in opposition the Temujin, but in SH 186 he is rewarded by Temüjin “for his services” after the defeat of Ong Qan. Seemingly he switched his allegiance from Ong Qan (and the Jurkin) back to Temüjin, perhaps at a critical point in the conflict. PH pp.36, 127, 254-7; SW pp. 90-91, 129. ** called “nökör” = chin-shih = serviteur, PH 230/254

[lxxxv][xxvi] SH166 names “Qardakid, Ebügejin, Noyakin, Söge’etei, To’oril, and Qachi’un-beki” here, but de Rachewiltz (V-73) is uncertain about the first three names. Muqur Qaurun supported Temüjin in his first battle against Jamuqa, leading the Adargin PH 36; thus “Qadarkid” here might refer to the Adargin tribe (PH p. 36). I am not able to identify Qurqaila; a Qurqai is named following Taqai on SW p. 129. Perhaps the la graph is interpolated, and perhaps Taqai-qurqai is the name of one man.

[lxxxvi][xxvii] As if we were to say, “I heard it with my own ears”. A similar expression is seen in SH 173.

[lxxxvii][xxviii] Literally “My body/self is finished/complete.”

[lxxxviii][xxix] My interpretation of this passage differs from that of the YS (p.9), which I think makes sense of the text by unjustifiably introducing new material. I take Ong, realizing that his son intends to defy him, to be making a baleful prophecy about their pastures being burned. In the YS His speech ends “If you able to do this yourself without causing me grief, go ahead”. The narrator then reports that “Jamuqa then set fire to the Emperor’s pastures and departed,” which, besides introducing Jamuqa without any warrant in the text, seems like a very forced reading of the Chinese. (The YS in almost every case uses the same graphs as the SW to represent Mongol names, so I do not believe that it is based either on an independent reading of the Mongol Altan Debter or on a different Chinese translation of that book-- though it could be based on a different SW text.)

My reading is consistent with SH 167, where Ong Qan marks his displacement by Senggum with a baleful prophecy: “Heaven will not love us”. In Rashid ad-din (p. 168, also relying on the Altan Debter), Ong Qan’s despair at Senggum’s defiance is very clear, and he does not in any way condone Senggum’s proposal (as he grudgingly does in the YS). However, the burning of Temujin’s pastures is also mentioned by Rashid. This weakens my argument, but it is not impossible that the SW translators and Rashid made the same misinterpretation of a gnomic Mongol text. It seems very unlikely that Jamuqa and Senggum would have burned Temujin’s pastures immediately before trying to lure him into the marriage trap.

[lxxxix][xxx] Kichalai is called Kiratai in SH 168.

[xc][xxxi] Yeke Chaqaran is thought to be an error for, or an alternative form of Yeke-Cheren, son of Qulan and a distant cousin of Temüjin: SH 169. Rashid (vol. II, p.169, fn. 1) transliterates “ikeh-jaraan”, which would be closest to something like “Yeke-Chara’an” and could point to either of the Mongol forms. However, the phrase I have translated “attendant” here indicates that Yeke-Chaqaran was in Ong’s service and not attached to an affiliated tribe. It is, however, possible that Yeke-cheren had attached himself to Ong Qan personally after the destruction of the Jurkin as an effective group.** check nökör = chin-shih = serviteur in PH 230/254

[xci][xxxii] In SH 169 it is Yeke-cheren’s wife Alaq-it who silences him, and there is only one son, Narin-ke’en. I suspect a textual problem. The SH speech reads literally “What we said just now -- our tongues should be taken out – whose mouth can we stop?” Even the SH Mongol version is very laconic, and neither Onon nor de Rachewiltz is able to translate quite literally. In Rashid (vol. II, p. 169) the wife is not named . His version reads “They should cut your tongues out! What is this you just said? You’re letting the whole secret out!”

[xcii][xxxiii] The story of Badai and Kishilik is one of the very few from Temüjin’s early career to appear in Juvaini: pp. 35-6.

[xciii][xxxiv] The Chinese phrase t’ai-tzu literally means “heir apparent” or “crown prince” and is correctly thus used in SW pp. 170, 173 to refer to the Chin crown prince. In the Chin and Yuan, however, a ruler could have several “crown princes”, and Chinggis Qan’s four sons by Börte are thus designated (individually and collectively) in many places in the text. This presumably reflects differences in customary succession practices, and in fact everyone named as a “crown princes” in the SW did have the right to succeed someone, though none of them had been designated as sole heir at that point.

Pelliot (PH pp. 149-151, 294, 339) believes that this phrase in the SW is a Chinese interpretive mistranslation of the Mongol word taishi (later taiji) which is derived from a Chinese title given to favored Mongol leaders. This title might have been derived from the Chinese word for “crown prince” just mentioned, but might just as well have been derived from the Chinese word t’ai-shih -- usually translated “Grand Tutor”. In any case, Chinese titles were honorifically awarded to non-Chinese without much attention to their actual Chinese meaning, and the title taishi evolved independently in Mongol to designate the most eminent tribal leaders who were not qans.

Pelliot’s conclusion here can be questioned. In the SW (SW 73, 98, 101, 114, 140; PH 170, 422), the meaningless Chinese phonetic phrase t’ai-shih (different from the Chinese phrase meaning translated “Grand Tutor) is regularly used to represent the Mongol word taishi; the Chinese phrase t’ai-tzu translated “crown prince” used only to refer to Temüjin, his four sons by Börte, and the Chin crown prince. (“Yeke-noyan the fourth crown prince” on p. 162 is an epithet for Tolui, Chinggis Qan’s fourth son: “The Great Lord”.) The Chinese transcription of the word taishi is never used to refer to anyone of these crown princes.

The phrase t’ai-tzu “crown prince” is only used of Temüjin in direct speech; the chronicler himself always calls him “The Emperor.” The first appearance of this phrase (PH p. 170) may indeed simply mean “taishi”, but I think that the next two appearances (PH 294) probably mean “crown prince”. Ong’s adoption of Temüjin implied the possibility that Temüjin might be Ong’s successor – and it was Ong’s son Senggum’s awareness of this threat that led to Ong’s break with Temüjin.

My translation “prince” is the same as Pelliot’s, and very loosely covers all the meanings of taishi/ taiji and t’ai-tzu. The Chinese translator clearly made a distinction between the two terms. Pelliot is probably, but not certainly, right in concluding that the two different phrases in the Chinese translation did not represent two different words in the Mongol original, but were just two different Chinese interpretations of the Mongol word taishi. However, this interlingual Sino-Mongol text is not properly Chinese either – in the native Chinese tradition it was utterly unimaginable to have four crown princes.

[xciv][xxxv] Shireljin: tributary of the Ulqui: fn. 12 above.

[xcv][xxxvi] Mau heights: near the Qalqa, probably near Lake Buir. SH 170, 173; deR, VI-45; Rashid, vol. II, p.170; Onon, p. 77; SW, p. 96.

[xcvi][xxxvii] Mounts Hula’ut and Buraqut: south side of Mau heights. SH various forms 163, 170, 173, 177; deR V-71; Rashid, vol. II, p. 170, p. 176; SW p. 97.

[xcvii][xxxviii] Yeder and Taichu: In SH 170 the herdsmen are Yadir and Chigidei.

[xcviii][xxxix] Qaraljit steppe. South of Mau heights and Qalqa River. SW 98; SH 175, 191, 192; deR VI-45,; Onon p. 82; Poppe p. 41; Rashid, vol. II, pp. 172, 181.

[xcix][xl] Jirgen. These front-line troops of Ong Qan were probably the survivors of the rebellious Jurkin tribe (Temüjin’s near relatives): see PH pp. 56, 398. The Jurkin contended with Temüjin for leadership of the descendants of Qabul Qan. Their leaders were Seche-beki and Taichu of the line of Okin-barqaq and Quduqtu-beki, but any descendent of Qabul who accepted Jurkin leadership could be called a Jurkin – e.g., Buri-bökö, Qulan in note 8 above, and (according to me) Altan, Quchar, and Yeke-cheren in this episode.

The Jirgin only appear on the scene (SH 170) after the Jurkin have been destroyed as a tribe (SH 140). The Jurkin leaders Seche-beki and Taichu were killed in SH 136, and Buri-boko was killed in SH 140, but Altan, Quchar, and Yeke-cheren were still alive and in Ong Qan’s camp. Altan and Quchar had promised to help Ong Qan in Part F of my translation and it would seem odd if their part in the battle were not mentioned at all. They had only recently affiliated with Ong Qan after having been enemies and, according to Mongol custom, would normally have been placed on the front line, as the Jirgin were. None of the three appear in the narrative after this battle: their deaths are not narrated, but the deaths of Altan and Quchar at the hands of Temüjin are referred to in SH 246 and 255. (The only Jirgin leader named as such is the otherwise-unknown Qadaq, who appears in SH 170 and 185.)

On SW p. 98 Ong Qan’s front line troops are in fact called the Jurkin. These names are vary inconsistently transliterated: Onon and

de Rachewiltz transcribe the name Jurkin also as Yurki[n] (SH 49); de Rachewiltz (VI-p.46) transcribes Jirgen as Jirgin or Chirkin; Pelliot offers still other transliterations. Pelliot (p. 56) notes that some Kereyit leaders and their troops were in fact Mongols. See also deR. VII-61.

[c][xli] In SH 150 the Dongqayit and the Tümen-Tübegen, Kereyit sub-tribes or Kereyit vassal tribes, follow Jaqa-gambu when the latter affiliates with Temüjin after having separated from his brother, Ong Qan. (PH 224, SW 61; the version of this story seen in Rashid is significantly different: pp. 123-4). In Temüjin’s first battle with Jamuqa he had already been supported by the Tübegen Kereyit, led by the Mongol Bültechü-ba’atur: PH pp. 36, 54-5. Togan has called attention to the confusion in the sources about Jaqa-gambu’s highly significant role in Temüjin’s career. See also Rashid, pp. 153, 159; SH 186, 208.

[ci][xlii] Ornu’u-*kelgelge. SH 191, 192, 175; deR VI-50; SW 98; Onon 82. The Ornu’u probably the area inside a bend in the Qalqa; Kelgelge probably is the Keltegei-qada “jagged cliffs” near the Ornu’u.

[cii][xliii] The present Qalqa, which runs into lake Buir from the southeast. SW 98; SH 175-6, 191-2, 208. Hambis, L. “Survivance de Toponyms”.

[ciii][xliv] In SH 176 the Onggirat leaders are Terge and Emel (or possibly one man, Terge-emel).

[civ][xlv] The Onggirat customarily married their daughters to the Mongols. I believe that Temüjin is threatening to sever relations with the Onggirat by killing the Mongols’ Onggirat wives. In SH 177 Ong Qan (during his flight) is said is said to have given his daughter in marriage to the Merkit Toqto’a as “a face”: i.e., to gain the protection of an in-law relationship. The phrase I have translated “hostage” literally means “endowment, talent”, which I think here also has the sense of “pledge”. See deR VI, pp. 52-3.

[cv][xlvi] Tüngge: a marsh or lake near the Qalqa and lake Buir. The Mongol SH 177 calls it the Tüngge qoroqan “stream”. SH 177, SW 100, deR VI-50, Rashid, vol. II, p. 173, PH 381.

[cvi][xlvii] Torqa-qorqa. SW 100, PH #23, Rashid vol. II, p. 173. According to SW, a different name for Tüngge.

[cvii][xlviii] It is often claimed that the SH is not history at all, but an epic or heroic poem. Waley, Ratchnevsky, and Pelliot, in fact, seem to be trying to outdo one another in denigrating the SH as a historical source. Waley states (pp. 7-8 ) without any argument that “Contrary to some scholars I regard the historical value of the Secret History as almost nil...” (Waley attributes most of the SH to about 1250 A.D., which means that it took the Mongols only about five decades to completely obscure historical reality). According to Pelliot, the Secret History “ne peut pas etre consideree comme un ouvrage historique” (PH p. xiii). The captured bride was a common figures in the actual life of the Mongols, but the story of Börte’s abduction and rescue is described by Pelliot as a “recit romanesque” (PH p.413.) Ratchnevsky says that the author of the SH “was obviously not concerned to offer a coherent picture of the course of history; his interest focused on the deeds of his heroes”, going on to say that the SH “closely resembles and epic poem in which imaginary dialogue, romantic embellishments, and folkloric motifs serve to dramatize the events described” (pp. xiv-xv).

In two places heroic elements absent from the SW and SH appear in Rashid’s version of the story (PH p. 381 and Ratchnevsky 29). Astonishingly, Pelliot uses this as evidence against the Mongol version, where heroic elements do not appear! (Both the Persian and the Buddhist late Mongol versions of Temüjin’s story are much more filled with heroic poetry, ruminations about divine providence, and magical events than are either the SW or the SH.)

The SH is a composite work. Some of the elements included were originally “folkloric” or “heroic”, but the overwhelming tendency of the work is to minimize these elements.

[cviii][xlix] I have not seen much discussion of two interesting questions about the SW. First, to what degree is the SW only a partial translation of the Altan Debter? Hambis (PH pp. xiv-xv) has noted that Rashid and the YS both relate stories about Temüjin’s ancestors which are not found in the SW or the SH. Are there more deletions than this? Second, why were there two distinctly different Mongol chronicles? Were they competing accounts, or were they produced entirely independently at two different places and times?

[cix][l] I have not made any study of early Chinese colloquial bai-hua, but to me the language of the SW, while clearly not good literary Chinese, does not seem like fluent colloquial Chinese either. I found certain passages so difficult that at times I came to doubt my own command of the Chinese language, but in general I found the parallel YS versions quite intelligible when they were available. However, the most difficult SW passages are often eliminated or very briefly summarized in the YS (e.g. Taqaiqa’s story in section B above, or the dialogue in Yeke-Chaqaran’s family in section H), and in at least one case I think the YS misconstrues the SW with a highly interpretive translation: see note 29 above. (If I am correct, the YS should only very carefully be used to correct or supplement the SW).

[cx][li] Ratchnevsky (pp. xiv-xv, p. 153) claims that the SH author was an enemy of Temüjin and tried to put him in a bad light. There are multiple grounds for rejecting this conclusion. I find it very hard to imagine how any Mongol could have nurtured an enmity to Temüjin between 1206, when he gained almost total control, and his death in1228. In 1206 some of his surviving enemies fled to Qara-qitai with Küchülük, whereas others fled to the west. All others were expected to give active and unwavering support to the new Chinggis Qan, one of whose chief goals was the pursuit and destruction of these enemies. While it can be assumed that the Chinese and Persians in the Mongol service had sharply mixed feelings about their masters, I do not think that Mongols had either the motive or the capacity for this kind of protracted secret opposition.

Some of Ratchnevsky’s arguments here are grounded on his erroneous belief that the Mongol records are, or should be, oral epic poems. Chinggis Qan was an innovator whose armies were organized on the non-heroic, rational chain-of-command principle. The Mongols also had an aversion to puffery and the SH chronicler felt no need to show Temujin/ Chinggis Qan as perfect or superhuman. The simplicity of the Mongol titles and court protocols were noted by many observers, and to the Mongols the grandiose titles of the doomed Khwarizmian and Jurchen Chin rulers could only be perceived as pathetic evasions of reality. Chinggis Qan’s great success was its own justification, and did not need to be buttressed either with grandiose titles or stories of superhuman prowess.

[cxi][lii] Hambis, 1975, p. 7.

[cxii][liii] Background of the Tatar revolt: PH 194-199. A later revolt by the Juyin troops guarding the Chin northwestern frontier is reported by Buell. For whatever reason, the Chin seemed to be taking a more aggressive stance on their frontier during this period, consistently alienating the allies guarding their border.

[cxiii][liv] For example, Sorqan Shira and his family, Suldus subjects of the Tayyichi’ut, early on took an enormous risk in helping Temüjin escape from his captors; even so, from fear of bloody retribution they were quite late to join Temüjin’s forces. SH 82-87, 146, 219; PH p.157.

[cxiv][lv] PH pp.139-41.

[cxv][lvi] See note 41 above.

[cxvi][lvii] The Mangqut and the Uru’ut had fought for Jamuqa during his first battle with Temüjin, but had shifted their allegiance to Temüjin immediately after the battle (SH 130). However, they are not mentioned in the intervening period which includes the battle against Jamuqa the Gur Qan. When they serve as Temüjin’s vanguard in SH 170, they are perhaps finally redeeming the pledge made long before.

[cxvii][lviii] In SH 183 (SW p. 127), Qasar leaves his family with Ong Qan and joins Temüjin between Temüjin’s first and second battles with Ong Qan. He then sends a deceiving message offering support to Ong Qan, thereby setting up Temüjin’s surprise attack. It has been noted that Ong Qan’s willingness to believe Qasar’s offer suggests that, like most of Temüjin’s other relatives, Qasar had been in Ong Qan’s forces during the first attack on Temüjin. (See Ratchnevsky p. 99, PH p. 172.)

[cxviii][lix] Fletcher (VII, p. 238-9; IX, 16-24) sees bloody intra-familial strife at every succession (“tanistry”) as a steppe institution, rather than as a breakdown of order. I think that the two Mongol models of order seen in the SH (cooperation vs. hierarchy) can be understood in terms of Leach’s analysis (pp.197-212) of the gumsa-gumlao contrast in highland Burma: one pole being the strong, murderous unifying qans, and the other being a fragmented system with many weak, ever-feuding leaders. Examples can be proliferated, not only from steppe leaders such as Mo-tun of the Hsiung-nü and the founders of the Jurchen Chin and other steppe dynasties, but even from the early years of the San-kuo Wei and the T’ang dynasties.

The Secret History’s insistence on hierarchal unity is not much different from the Chinese view. For example, Mo Tzu sec. 11, “Shang T’ung Shang”: “Before there were any laws and government, every man’s view of justice was different. One man had one view, two men had two views, ten men had ten views – the more men, the more views of justice. Moreover, each man believed that his own view was correct and disapproved of those of others, so that people spent their time condemning one another.” (My translation: Mei p. 110-111).

Using African and Polynesian evidence, Sagan goes on to generalize on the murder of kin as a necessary stage in the process of state-formation; on this, see also Gellner’s introduction to Khazanov.


Brettschneider, E., Medieval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources, London, 1888.

Buell, Paul D, “The Role of the Sino-Mongolian Frontier Zone in the Rise of Chinggis-Qan”, pp. 63-76, Studies on Mongolia, ed. Schwarz, Bellingham, 1979.

Chung-wen Ta Tz’u-tien, Taipei, 1973.

de R: de Rachewiltz, Igor, The Secret History of the Mongols, Papers in Far Eastern History, Canberra, 1971-1985. (IV: vol. 10, Sept. 74, pp. 55-82; V: vol. 13, Mar. 1976, pp. 41-75; VI: vol. 16, Dept. 1977, pp. 27-65; VII: vol. 18, Sept 1978, pp. 45-80.)

Fletcher, Joseph F., Studies in Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia, Variorum, 1995.

Hambis, L., Gengis-khan, Paris, 1973.

Hambis, L., “Survivance de Toponyms”, Melanges de sinologie offert a M. P. Demieville, Paris, 1974.

Hambis, L., “Un episode mal connu de l’histoire de Gengis-khan”, Journal des Savants, January-March 1975, pp. 5-46.

Juvaini, Ata-malik (tr. Boyle), Genghis Khan, U. of Washington, 1997.

Khazanov, A. P., Nomads and the Outside World, Wisconsin, 1994.

Leach, Edmund, Political Systems of Highland Burma, Beacon, 1954.

Lindner, Rudi Paul, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1982.

Mo Tzu: The works of Motze, Confucius Publishing Company, Taipei, 1976: English translation by Y.P. Mei, and modern Chinese translation by Shih Ch’ao.

Onon, Urgunge (tr.), The Secret History of the Mongols, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1990.

Pelliot, Paul, Notes on Marco Polo, Paris, 1959, 1963, 1973 (3 vols.)

PH: Pelliot, Paul, and Hambis, L., Histoire des Campagnes de Gengis Khan, Leiden, 1951.

Poppe, Nicholas, “On Some Geographical Names in the Jami al-Tawarix”, HJAS, #19, 1951, pp 33-51.

Rashid ad-din, Shi Ji, tr. Xu Da-jun and Zhou Jien-qi, Beijing, 1983. (Translated from the Russian.)

Ratchnevsky, Paul, Genghis Khan, Blackwell, 1991.

Sagan, Eli, At the Dawn of Tyranny, Vintage, 1993.

Sivin, Nathan (ed.), The Contemporary Atlas of China, Boston, 1988.

SW: Wang Kuo-wei, Meng-ku Shih-liao Ssu-chung, Peking, 1934.

Tan Qi-xiang, The Historical Atlas of China, vol. VI, Beijing, 1982.

Togan, Isenbike, Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations, Brill, 1998.

Togan, A. Z. V, “The Composition of the History of the Mongols by Rashid-al-din”, Central Asian Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1962.

Waley, Arthur, Travels of an Alchemist, London, 1931.

Waley, Arthur, The Secret History of the Mongols and other pieces, London, 1966.

Wang Kuo-wei: see SW.

YS: Yuan Shih, Sung Lien ed., Beijing, 1976.

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Ditu, Xinhua Shudian Ditu Chubanshe, Beijing, 1974.

ZJ: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fensheng Ditu Ji, Xinhua Shudian Ditu Chubanshe, Beijing, 1974
Вернуться к началу
Посмотреть профиль Отправить личное сообщение Отправить e-mail Yahoo Messenger ICQ Number
баймга ороошо

Зарегистрирован: Jan 23, 2006
Сообщения: 285
СообщениеДобавлено: 08.09.06, 11:47 +0000     Ответить с цитатой

...можно перевести для некоторых :roll:
Вернуться к началу
Посмотреть профиль Отправить личное сообщение
соохор адуу

Зарегистрирован: May 21, 2004
Сообщения: 2359
Откуда: Ургэн Сухын хойноос бэшэ Хабтагай Туулын хаяанаас
СообщениеДобавлено: 09.09.06, 03:42 +0000     Ответить с цитатой

нэгэ заа хулеэн байгты даа. орчуулжархина лдаа, хэдэ хоногоос. тиижи байтараа Сакура али бэшид англи хэлэтэи бэрхэ зонууд тусалаха юм аабза даа. :)
Вернуться к началу
Посмотреть профиль Отправить личное сообщение Отправить e-mail Yahoo Messenger ICQ Number
соохор адуу

Зарегистрирован: May 21, 2004
Сообщения: 2359
Откуда: Ургэн Сухын хойноос бэшэ Хабтагай Туулын хаяанаас
СообщениеДобавлено: 11.09.06, 12:44 +0000     Ответить с цитатой

Шэнь у цинь чжэнь лу.


[Начало … датирован 1201 г. Начиная с 1196 стареющий кэрэитский правитель Он хан продолжал вести военную действию против некогда-доминировавщих татар и других племен для получения право контролировать северо-западную границу Цзиньского Китая. Осиротевший и брошенный родственниками в детстве Тэмуджин в возрасте 34 лет(позже Чингисхан, здесь назван Императором) стал важным союзником Он хана. Жамуха, близкий друг Тэмуджина, кто раньше был ... Он хана, стал лидером оппозиции этих последних двух.]


В это время племя (х)онгиратов к нам еще не присоединились. Младший брат императора Хасар отдельно жил. Согласившись на план его соратника Жэбгэ, Хасар пошел разграбить онгиратов. Император жестко ругал его за это.

Тогда онгираты присоединись к Жамухе. Они собрались вместе с племенами Икирэс, Корулас, Дорбэн, Татар, Хатагин, Сэлджиуд на реке Ган. Вместе они титуловали Жамуху Гур ханом и решили напасть на нас. Они обещали об этом на реке Тулбэр принесли следующую клятву:
“Кто осмелит нарушить свои клятва пусть разрушится как этот берег реки и пусть валятся как эти дерева!”. После этих слов они растоптали своими ногами берег и принялись рубить своими мечами дерева леса. Поскакая на своих конях их армия двинулась.


В это время наша армия имела человека по имени Тахайха в армии Жамухи. Императорский соратник из джэуредов Чаур был его родственником и гостил у него в это время. Это случилось когда они ездили верхом вместе. Чаур не знал о заговоре. Тахайха стукнул(нудараад абаа) Чаура и он развернулся к нему. Узнав что Тахайха хочет что-то сказать, Чаур слез с коня делая вид якобы хотел писаться. Тахайха тогда рассказал ему о договоре на реке и спросил “Ситуация критическая. Ты куда идешь?”
Чаур был еще предупрежден по дороге домой, он встретил коруласа Есугэя. Он рассказал ему о сложившейся ситуации и говорил что собирается передать об этом императору.

Есугэй сказал, “Мой сын от старшей жены поехал к Хулан буха. И я не знаю когда он возвратится. Около меня только дети малые и моя слуга Хоридай.” И он заставил Хоридая покляться и отправил его на сером осле с белым конем наставляя со словами: “Когда будешь там говори только с императором или с его хатуном. Или говори моему зятю Хасару.” И сказал ему вдобавок “Если ты передаешь эту тайну кому то другому я спущу твою куру с твоей спины и вырублю тебя на две части.” Клятва закончилась и Хоридай уехал.

По дороге он забежал к куреню Хулан Баатура и Хара-Мэргидэй и был схвачен ихними караулами, но был освбожен благодаря долголетней дружбы. Ему отдали жеребца халиун масти, и сказали “Этот конь спасет твой жизнь если ты будешь преследован. И он может догнать любого. Оседлай и езжай.” Он встретил табор белых кибитков направляющийся к кочевью Жамухи. Мужи из табора принялись преследовать Чаура, но Чаур ускакал от них. Когда он достиг кочевья он рассказал все императору об упоминавшемся заговоре выше. Император тогда собирал силы для встречи с армией Жамухи. Они сражались в степи Хайлар-тэни-горохан и Жамуха был разбит. Жамуха убежал и племя онгиратов присоединились к нам.


1202 г.

Император расположил войска на реке Улхуй-Ширэлджин чтобы напасть на алчи татар и чаган татар. В лето он расположил войска в Биджане. И он заставил свои войска принести клятву: “Если мы разобьем их то преследуем их в север. Если вы увидите оставленные вещи разбросанные тут, не остановливайтесь на них. Когда закончим с военным делом, то добыча будет разделено честно.” После великой победы, родственники императора Алтан, Хучар и Даридай нарушили свои клятва. Император послал своих двух военачальников Хубилай и Жэбэ отобрать их добычи и разделить те добычи среди войск.


Осенью найманский Буйруг хаган присоединился с меркитами Тогтоа-бэки, и племенами Дорбэн, Татар, Хатагин и Сэлджиуд вместе с Аучу-баатур, Худуга-бэки и с другими чтобы напасть на нас и Он хана. Император послал всадников на гор Нэгэн-Гуйлэту, Чэкчэр и Чикуркэй чтобы наблюдали оттуда за придвижением врага. Тогда всадник приехал из г. Чикуркэй и докладывал что найманские войска пребывают постепенно. Из Улхуй-Ширэлджина двинули свои войска император и Он хан внутрь Укрепленной линии. Сын Он хана Илха остался позади северной Укреплении и только после того как занял высот горы он разбил лагерь. Буйруг был уверен в себя, говоря: “Их армия разбросанна, когда они соберутся вместе мы нападем на них.” В это время Аучу и Ходу под командованием Эмэла, пришли присоединься к авангарду. Они хотели атаковать но увидев что позиция армии Илхи сильна, развернулись. Илха тоже попытался перейти укреплении и присоединиться к нашим войскам чтобы приготовиться к сражении. Кибитки багажа были отправлены в разные направлении. Император и Он хаган надеялись на Арал укреплении как на крепости. И было большое сражение в Куйтэнском степи. Враги подняли сильный шторм. И вдруг он превратился в снежную бурю. Их ослепшие войска упали в канавах и спотыкались в оврагах когда оступали. По дороге Жамуха возглавляя свои войска в отступлении разграбил тех племен кто возвели его в хаган.


Зимой император вышел из Укреплении и зимовал в Абджиа-Котэгэр. Он хаган разбил лагерь в пустыне Бэрхэ. В это время император хотел женить принца Джочи на дочери Он хагана Чаур-бэки и отдать свою дочь Ходжин-бэки внуку Он хагана Тусаха. Он хаган отверг эти предложении.


С этой времени император дистанцировался от Он хагана. Услышав об этом Джамуха пошел к Илхе, говоря “Мой анда часто посылает посланцев найманскому Таян хану чтобы договориться с ним. Для тебя ничего хорошего не будет из этого. Если ты сейчас нападешь на него я встану с тобой в плечо к плечу.” В это время Илха жил отдельно. И он пошел свидаться со своим отцом Он хаганом. Родственники императора Даридай отчигин, Алтан и Хучар и другие как Тахай, Хурхайла, Хадархид, Мухур-Хаурун и Джамуха все были против нас. Они говорили Илхе следующие слова: “Мы все будем поддерживать тебя до пределы нашей силы для наказания сыновей царицы матери Оэлун.” Илха согласился на их предложении и поставив курень из кибитков они составили план. Они отправили Сайхан-Тодоэна передать об этом Он хагану. Он хаган сказал, “Джамуха является подобострастным и не верным человеком. Ему нельзя верить.” Илха обратно послал ответа, “Джамуха имеет рот и язык, из-за чего я не должен довериться ему?”. Несколько раз он послал людей поговорить с Он хаганом. “Если я запрещу тебе, ты не послушаешься. Моя жизнь кончается, я теперь зависим от других. Я только хочу что мой старый скелет обретет спокойное место покоя. Разговор этот не кончится. Ты сделай то что можешь. Не принеси мне печаль и беду. Сейчас под разным командованием мои пастбища будут сожжены.”


1203 г.
Весной Он хаган сказал, “Раньше он хотел вступить с нами в родственный связь, но я отказал ему. Сейчас это должно быть разрешенным. Подождем когда он придет к празднованию ... и мы схватим его.” И он послал Бухадай и Кичалай пригалсить императора. Император вместе с десятью всадниками отправился в гости. И он остановился переночевать у отца Мунлика. Он отправил посланца Он хагану со словами: “Мои табуны истощены и яя должен кормить их. Не достаточно ли одного человека отправить для празднования?” Отправив это послание император вернулся.


В это время служащий Он хагана Ехэ Чахаран узнал об этом заговоре против императора. Вернувшись домой он рассказал об этом своей жене и добавил: “Если кто-нибудь доставит это сведение императору, кто скажет что будет?”. Его сын Илхан остановил его, говоря “Это только разговор. Но я боюсь что остальные могут подумать что это серьезно.” Ехэ-Чахарана пастух Кишилик случился с этим когда он принес кумыс и услышал об этом незаметно. Он спросил своего брата Бадая “Что это было то что они сейчас говорили? Ты что нибудь знаешь об этом?” Бадай сказал :“Я ничего не знаю.” Второй сын Чахарана, Нарин сидел снаружи юрты отточивая наконечники своих стрел говорил “Пусть молчали бы. Мы должны говорить об этом. Сегодняшное дело уже решено. Чью же рот они должны затыкать?”. Бадай говорил Кишилику “Мы теперь знаем. Поедем к императору и известим его.” И они пошли домой планировать их поездку. Они имели только одного ягненка которого они забили и разбили свои кровати чтобы приготовить его. Той ночью они поспешили к императору известить о заговоре, говоря “Он хаган составил заговор против принца. Схема уже разработана.”


Услышав об этом император стационировал свои войска в Арал Укреплении и быстро отправил свои кибитки багажа вверх по Ширэлджин реке. Он послал Джэлмэ в северную сторону горы Мау-Ундур в качаетве авангардного дозорного. Он хаган тоже послал свои войска с гор Хулауд и Бурахуд по южной стороне горы Мау-Ундур. В это время Тайчу и Едэр пасли табун там и увидели что войска Он хагана приближается. И они немедленно отправились сообщить об этом императору. Он тогда двинул свои войска Харалджидскую степь. Когда солнце село за горой он не успел приготовить войска к сражению. И как только ввел в порядок император вышел биться. Первым он разбил войска племени Джиргин, а потом племени Донхайд. После них он разбил войска Хори-шилэмун тайши и начал притеснять главные сили Он хагана которые заняли защитные позиции. Сын Он хагана Илха поскакал атаковать наши позиции но наши солдаты застрелили его в щеку.


Когда его положение оказался опасным, Он хан отступил. И император тоже отступил к Орнугу-Кэлгэлгэ, вниз по Халха реке разделив свое войско на две части. Император лично возглавлял 2300 воинов на южном берегу, Урууд и Мангуды тоже с 2300 воинами заняли позиции на северном берегу. Как онгиратский зять император послал посланца первым к их вождям Тэмугэ и Эмэл со словами “Если вы придете ко мне и будете выслушаться меня то ваша дочь встретится с вами и ваша племянница будет жива. Если нет то я нападу на вас.” Тогда он достиг Тунгэ и маршировал к Торха горха разбиться лагерем. [Пережив нападение Он хана, Тэмуджин собирал свои сила и бросил вызов Он хану и его соратникам включая его родственников из Джуркин. Внезапным нападением он уничтожил силы Он хана и становился Чингис ханом. Покорив найман и меркитов, он обращает свое внимание на Хорезм, тангутский Си Ся и Цзиньский Китай.]

Продолжение следует...
Вернуться к началу
Посмотреть профиль Отправить личное сообщение Отправить e-mail Yahoo Messenger ICQ Number

Зарегистрирован: Oct 04, 2004
Сообщения: 4915
Откуда: ...где-то рядом
СообщениеДобавлено: 21.04.08, 13:45 +0000     Ответить с цитатой

Сонгоол, потрясающая вещь! Спасибо огромное за публикацию.

Yesügei said, “The son of my chief wife has gone to Qulan Buqa[vii][vii][and the day of his return is not known.]
Around me I only have children and my servant Qoridai.” So he had Qoridai swear an oath and sent him riding a grey donkey with a white horse following, saying, “When you get there speak only with the Emperor or his Qatun, or to my son-in-law Qasar[viii][viii].” And he told him “If you leak this to anyone else I will split your spine and cut you in half at the waist.” The oath finished, Qoridai left.

Кто нибудь может пояснить текст?
Вернуться к началу
Посмотреть профиль Отправить личное сообщение
соохор адуу

Зарегистрирован: May 21, 2004
Сообщения: 2359
Откуда: Ургэн Сухын хойноос бэшэ Хабтагай Туулын хаяанаас
СообщениеДобавлено: 22.04.08, 00:05 +0000     Ответить с цитатой

Есугэй сказал, “Мой сын от старшей жены поехал к Хулан буха. И я не знаю когда он возвратится. Около меня только дети малые и моя слуга Хоридай.” И он заставил Хоридая покляться и отправил его на сером осле с белым конем наставляя со словами: “Когда будешь там говори только с императором или с его хатуном. Или говори моему зятю Хасару.” И сказал ему вдобавок “Если ты передаешь эту тайну кому то другому я спущу твою куру с твоей спины и вырублю тебя на две части.” Клятва закончилась и Хоридай уехал.

как видно кураласы осознавали себя еще хори, поэтому давали имена типа Хоридай.
Есугэй из кориласов тесть Хасара.
Вернуться к началу
Посмотреть профиль Отправить личное сообщение Отправить e-mail Yahoo Messenger ICQ Number
соохор адуу

Зарегистрирован: May 21, 2004
Сообщения: 2359
Откуда: Ургэн Сухын хойноос бэшэ Хабтагай Туулын хаяанаас
СообщениеДобавлено: 28.09.08, 07:40 +0000     Ответить с цитатой

на днях купил источник на старомонгольском.

вот пока этот отрывок.

Улаагчин ухэр жил(1217 г.) Чингис хаан их өрлөг Субээдэй баатарт төмөр дугуйт тэрэг өгч Мэргид аймгийг байлдахаар томилов. өрнө зугийн аймаг олныг байлдахаар урьдчилан явуулсан хошууч Тохучарын захирсан хоер мянган цэрэгтэй Субээдэй очиж нийлэв. Эд нар Чуй голд хурч Мэргид аймгийн эзэн Худутай учирч ихээр байлдаад мэргид аймгийг бур сөнөөж буцаж ирвэй. Мөн жил Тумэд аймгийн эзэн Тайдула Сохор дагаар ирээд удсангуй бас урвавай. Чингис хаан Борохул нойон, Дөрби догшин хоер өрлөгийг илгээж тувшитгээд Борохул нойон тэнд ухвэй.

...Урьд Тумэд аймаг урвасанд Чингис хаан элч илгээж Хиргис аймагаас цэрэг авахад Хиргис аймаг цэрэг өгсөнгуй бөгөөд урважээ.
Уунд их хөвуун Жөчийг байлдуулахаар зарлиг буулган бас Буха-г хошуучаар явуулав. Буха хиргис нарыг Имэр гол хуртэл нэхээд буцвай. Жөчи цэргээ авч Енисей мөрнийг гэтэлж мөрнийг дагасан аймгууд болох урсуд, хабханас, тэнлэг, хэстими зэрэг ойн олон аймгийг эзэлж авчээ.
миний блогто айлчалаарай!!!
Вернуться к началу
Посмотреть профиль Отправить личное сообщение Отправить e-mail Yahoo Messenger ICQ Number
Показать сообщения:   
Начать новую тему   Ответить на тему    Список форумов Сайт бурятского народа -> Соёл түүхын шуулган Часовой пояс: GMT - 3
Страница 1 из 1

Поставить закладку
Версия для печати (вся тема целиком, трафик!)

Вы не можете начинать темы
Вы не можете отвечать на сообщения
Вы не можете редактировать свои сообщения
Вы не можете удалять свои сообщения
Вы не можете голосовать в опросах
Книга Зүрхэ сэдьхэлэй оëорhоо. Гармаева С. Д.